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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues to be presented by this appeal are: 
1. Is it an abuse of discretion by a trial judge 
hearing a personal injury case without a jury to deny a 
Defendant's oral motion made on the day of trial to have a 
bifurcated trial on the separate issues of liability and damages? 
2. .Did the Court err in permitting medical testimony 
by Plaintiff's two treating physicians, one being an orthopedic 
surgeon, at the trial of a personal injury case when the 
Defendant's Counsel on the day of trial objected to such 
proferred testimony on the grounds it would show permanent 
injury, claiming surprise because the Plaintiff's Complaint did 
not specify permanency as a specified element of damages? 
3. In a non-jury trial of a personal injury case where 
the Defendant failed during the two-year pre-trial period to use 
the available discovery devices sufficiently to obtain facts as 
to Plaintiff's physical ailments, including permanent injury, 
is it reversible error for the trial court to have denied 
Defendant a continuance to permit further discovery on the 
Defendant's claim on the day of trial that it was surprised that 
Plaintiff had a permanent injury as part of his general damage 
claim? 
4. In a non-jury trial of a personal injury case, is 
it reversible error for the trial court after both sides have 
rested their cases to give its findings, conclusions and decisi'on 
from the bench without asking either party to make final 
argument, no request for final argument having been made and no 
objection to the procedure by either party being offered at the 
trial level? 
II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal injury 
brought by Carl C. Talbot, Plaintiff-Respondent, against the City 
of St. George, Utah. Plaintiff was injured on April 5, 1983 
when, as a pedestrian, he was struck on his back by a protruding 
pipe vise mounted on the side of a city pickup truck. Talbot, 
himself a truck driver, was treated by his family physician and 
an orthopedic surgeon at St. George, Utah over a period of time. 
Complaint was filed September 19, 1983. An amended answer was 
filed by Defendant, City, on June 21, 1984. After a pretrial 
hearing on December 14, 1984, a one-day non-jury trial was held 
to the Fifth District Court, J. Harlan Burns, Judge, on June 13, 
1985. At the conclusion of the one-day trial, the Court 
announced from the bench its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law determining Plaintiff Talbot was entitled to recover of the 
City $3,392.00 in Special Damages and $23,744.00 in General 
Damages for a total recovery of $27,136.00 plus costs. Judgment 
was thereafter entered accordingly and this appeal by Defendant 
City, followed. 
Ill 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELATIVE TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On April 5, 1983, Carl C. Talbot, a man 45 years of 
age, who lives at St. George, Utah (Court Reporter Transcript, 
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Trans. Pg. 39, L. 18-23; Pg 50, L. 17-24). The pipe vise is 
shown in Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 and the City vehicle in 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6. (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg. 101, L 
1-24). 
After lying on the ground for some time, Mr. Talbot got 
to his feet and talked to both Mr. Laub and Mr. Larsen, the City 
employees and told them what had happened. He showed them the 
marks on his back where he had been hit by the pipe rack. (Ct. 
Rep. Trans. Pg. 39, L 4-16, 25; Pg. 40, L 1-16). Until told by 
him at the site, the City employees said they had not been aware 
that Mr. Talbot was injured. Also, Mr. Larsen said he did not 
see Talbot move away from the City truck as it drove off and 
therefore failed to know where he was as the truck with the vise 
attached drove off. (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg. 110, L 16-25, Pg. Ill, L 
1-24). 
Mr. Talbot then got into his truck, dumped his load and 
returned to the J&J Mill and Lumber Company. On the way back to 
the yard his back was hurting and after he reported the accident 
to his employer, he took the rest of the day off. (Ct. Rep. 
Trans. Pg. 40, L 20-25; Pg. 41, L 1-11). He consulted his family 
doctor, Dr. Thomas Callahan, the next morning, was x-rayed and 
treated with pain pills. He was subsequently referred to Dr. 
Neal Cape! , orthopedic surgeon. A back brace was prescribed, 
along with therapy. He received therapy treatments and did 
prescribed swimming and other exercises. (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg. 
42-44). 
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date of July 9, 1983 in which the question "Will any permanent 
injury or deformity result? If so, to wnat extent." was 
answered: "None expected." Dr. Cape! testified that this was a 
routine report form one month into his treatment of Talbot, and 
was prepared by Mr. Little of his office and was not an answer in 
depth. (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pgs. 90,91) He further testified on 
cross examination about the Plaintiff's present physical 
condition and activity limitations as found on examination the 
day before trial; further, that he advised Mr. Talbot as to 
devices and medicines which would help, but he said he would 
require him to modify his working environment to accommodate his 
injured condition. (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pgs. 92-94 inclusive). 
The effect of continuing present day-to-day use of 
gravity traction by Talbot was, according to Dr. Cape! , possibly 
helpful but not prescribed by him. (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg. 94, L 
12-25; Pgs. 95, 96). Also the patient's problem with 
anti-inf1ammatory drugs due to a pre-existing ulcer problem was 
described by Dr. Cape! . (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg. 97, L 8-25, Pg 98, 
Pg. 99, L 1-4) 
Without objection, the Court took judicial notice of 
the U. S. Life Tables showing a 45 year-old white male has a life 
expectancy of 27.3 years (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg. 123, 124). The 
Court found for the Plaintiff on the issue of liability. The 
Court found Special Damages consisted of lost time and wages of 
$2,480 and it was not contested that the medical and related 
expenses amounted to $912.00 for total Special Damages of 
$3,392.00. The Court awarded General Damages of $23,744.00 for a 
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Trans. Pg. 4, L19-24) The record does not support these negative 
claims by counsel for the City, but for the convenience of the 
Court, a copy of the original working pretrial order draft made 
by counsel for Plaintiff, a copy of which was delivered to Mr. 
Watson, attorney for the City, in Court on December 14, 1984 at 
the Pretrial Conference is contained in the Addendum to this 
Brief at Pages A-7 to A-16 inclusive. Unfortunately, this file 
copy contains long hand editing made after December 14, 1984, 
which editing should be disregarded. A copy of the final 
Pretrial Order prepared by Plaintiff's Counsel was delivered to 
the Court as required on the trial date and is shown in the 
original record. (Transcript, Page 90-99). The reference on page 
4 (TR 93) to claim of permanent disability is the same as it was 
in the December 14, 1984 draft shown beginning at the Addendum at 
Page A-7. 
Defendant's Brief on Page 7 states as a fact that 
Defendant was surprised on the day of trial and was "Therefore 
unable to adequately prepare a defense for permanent disability 
since none was expected and none was alleged until the date of 
trial." This is not a correct statement and is not supported by 
reference to the record. The argument section of this brief will 
further consider this claim by Defense counsel. 
IV 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct. 
It is incumbent upon the Appellant to demonstrate precise errors 
warranting a reversal. All reasonable presumptions are made in 
-8-
favor of the trial court based on the record and the findings and 
actions of the trial court will not be disturbed if they are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
The issues in this case framed by the pleadings under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure were (1) Liability and (2) Damages. 
This Appeal does not concern itself with the trial court's 
determination that the Defendant City, was liable for Plaintiff's 
personal injuries, or the amount of the damages awarded. Under 
the Notice Pleading Statutes of Utah the issues were fairly 
pieaded. 
By any reasonable standard, Defendant cannot be said to 
have adequately used the discovery procedures and opportunities 
available under the Rules to determine the facts and was dilatory 
in preparation of its case, all to its detriment on the day of 
trial. The trial court was correct in refusing (1) to bifurcate 
the trial which was a non-jury proceeding and (2) to grant a 
continuance. Also, the claim by Defendant City, that it was 
surprised Plaintiff's injuries were of a continuing and permanent 
nature is unrealistic and did not entitle the Defendant City, to 
a continuance on the day of trial. The claim of a new issue 
being presented on the trial date is not supported by the record. 
The nature and extent of Plaintiff's injuries including 
the extent of permanency, was fairly proved by the evidence and 
the trial court's rulings on admission of evidence were without 
error. 
When the Court, at the conclusion of the evidence in 
this one-day non-jury civil case, announced its decision from the 
-9-
bench without any attorney summation or closing argument, there 
was no violation as to the City of St. George due process 
guarantees. The record shows no request by the City for final 
argument or other objection made to the trial court at the time. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
bifurcation of the trial of the two issues, that is, (1) 
liability and (2) damages, or in denying a request for 
continuance on the trial date. The award of damages was 
supported by substantial, competent evidence and the decision of 
the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. 
V 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE ACTED 
CORRECTLY. 
The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct. 
It is incumbent upon the Appellant to demonstrate precise errors 
warranting a reversal. All reasonable presumptions are made in 
favor of the trial court based on the record and the findings and 
action of the trial court will not be disturbed if they are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. A quotation from 
the court's opinion in Williams v. State Farm Insurance Company, 
(1982) 656 P2nd 966, sets forth the pertinent law in this state, 
at 656 P2nd 968: 
On appeal, the record is reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the findings and action of the trial 
court, which are entitled to a presumption of validity 
and will not be disturbed if they are supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. Search v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 649 P2nd 48 (1982); Litho Sales, 
Inc. v. Cutrubus, Utah, 636 P2nd 487, 1981; Car Doctor, 
Inc. v. Belmont, Utah, 635 P2nd 82 (1981); Hutcheson v. 
Gleave, Utah, 632 P2nd 815 (1981). 
_ i n 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Trial Court (TR 107-110; Addendum Pgs. A-l to A-6) are specific, 
detailed, and unambiguous. In each particular they are supported 
by the evidence offered at the trial without specific objection 
by the Defendant-Appellant. The evidence was substantial and 
competent. 
B. THE ISSUES WERE PROPERLY FRAMED BY THE PLEADINGS UNDER 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND WERE (1) LIABILITY AND (2) 
DAMAGES. 
There were two basic issues in this case raised by the 
pleadings: 
1. Liability, including (a) whether the Defendant 
City's, actions were negligent and proximately caused injury to 
the Plaintiff and (b) whether the Plaintiff contributed to his 
own injuries, and 
2. Damages, including (a) special damages incurred and 
(b) general damages suffered by the Plaintiff. 
The first issue has been resolved and there is no 
dispute in this appeal with the trial court's determination that 
the Defendant City, was liable for Plaintiff's personal injuries. 
There is no dispute that the proof was sufficient to support the 
findings and conclusions of the Court in that regard as well as 
the conclusion of the Court that the Plaintiff, Talbot, was not 
contributorily negligent. 
The issue of Special Damages is not disputed in this 
appeal. The Court found the medical expenses and time lost from 
employment by the Plaintiff, Talbot, amounted to $3,392.00 for 
which he should recover and this amount was awarded as Special 
l^rn-i n n r 
This appeal is really aimed at a reversal of the 
General Damage award. It is not based on the failure of proof to 
support the award or on any claim that the award was contrary to 
law or not supported by the evidence. Rather, claims are made as 
fol1ows: 
1. The Court abused its discretion when it did not at 
Defendant's request on the day of trial bifurcate the trial to 
separate the trial before the Court, without a jury, on the 
issues of (1) negligence and (2) damages. 
2. The denial of Defendant's oral request for 
continuance based on claimed surprised on the day of trial was 
error. 
3. Defendant was arbitrarily denied a protected right 
when the Court decided the case without final argument from 
either party, although neither party objected at the time or 
demanded an opportunity to make such an argument. 
The discussion and argument with respect to whether the 
Defendant was prejudiced by the absence of final argument will be 
discussed under paragraph E of the Argument section of the Brief. 
Under the Notice Pleading statutes of Utah, the issues 
were fairly pleaded. Justice Oaks, in the decision rendered in 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., Supra, at page 970 of the 
decision, discussed Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which 
were adopted in 1950, stating as follows: 
Rule (8)(a)(l) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
adopted in 1950, requires that a pleading set forth "a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief ..." Defenses must be 
stated "in short and plain terms ..." Rule 8(b). "Each 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and 
direct," Rule 8(e)(1). Rule 8(c) specified that "_i_n 
pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively ... fraud ... and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." 
Finally, Rule 9(b) states that "_i_n all averments of 
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud 
or mistake shall be stated with particularity." 
Our decisions have construed these requirements. 
Burr y. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 204, 265 P.2d 383, 387 
i1953) unanimously approved a pleading the Court 
characterized as "a crisp statement of ultimate facts." 
That opinion quotes with approval the following passage 
from Hickman y. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 67 S.Ct. 
-389 9"1 L.Ed. 451 (1947), concerning the 
Rules, from which our Rules had been taken: 
J8E 385, 
Federal 
Under the prior federal practice, the pretrial 
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and 
fact-revelation were performed primarily and 
inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the 
issues and the facts before trial was narrowly 
confined and was often cumbersome in method. The 
new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the 
task of general notice-giving and invest the 
deposition-discovery process with a vital role in 
the preparation for trial. 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 
453, 453^ (1955), quoted this same language and also 
referred approvingly to other authorities, as follows: 
Thus, it can yery often be found stated in these 
cases that a complaint is required only to "*** 
give the opposing party fair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general 
indication of the type of litigation involved." 
"n this same opinion on Page 971, the Court stated: 
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the pleadings where appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also 
appears from the cited decisions that these principals 
are applied with great liberality in sustaining the 
sufficiency^of allegations stating a cause of action or 
an affirmative defense. (Emphasi s a dded) 
As is stated above, in Justice Oaks decision, our Rules 
have been taken from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 
leading case in the Federal system concerning notice pleading 
requirements is Conley v. Gibson, (1957) 355 US 41, 47-48, 78 
S.Ct. 99. The United States Supreme Court emphasized the proper 
role of pleadings in the following manner: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a 
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he 
bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules 
require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" 
that will give the Defendant fair notice of the what 
the Plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests. The illustrative form appended to the Rules 
plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "Notice 
Pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity 
for discovery and the other pretrial procedures 
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the 
basis of both claim and defense and to define more 
narrowly the disputed facts and issues the Federal 
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of 
skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive 
to the outcome and accept the principle that the 
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision 
on the merits. 
In our case the effort of the Defendant to raise as a 
"new issue" the question of the permanent impairment of the 
Plaintiff arising directly from the injury received in the 
accident upon which the City was found liable is not, in fact, 
under the Rules a "new issue" or the type of thing that would 
require the Plaintiff to have filed an additional count of 
complaint in order to permit him to recover. The nature and 
extent of the injuries including the partial permanent impairment 
of 10% of the Plaintiff were matters which were open to discovery 
under the pleadings. As will be discussed in paragraph C of this 
argument, the Defendant just did not give this case the attention 
that i t deserved. 
C. DEFENDANT FAILED TO UTILIZE EFFECTIVELY DISCOVERY 
PROCEDURES AVAILABLE UNDER THE RULES TO ITS DETRIMENT ON THE DAY 
OF TRIAL. 
By any reasonable standard, Defendant cannot be said to 
have adequately used the discovery procedures and opportunities 
available under the Rules to determine the facts and was dilatory 
in preparation of its case, all to its detriment on the day of 
trial. 
Plaintiff asserts that: (1) Defendant had no right to 
bifurcation of the trial before the Court and that the denial of 
its request therefore was not error; (2) that the claims of 
surprise on the part of Defendant's counsel are not of substance 
and do not constitute valid grounds for reversal for the reasons 
that: 
(a) The nature and extent of the Plaintiff's injuries 
were Plaintiff's burden of proof under his complaint and this 
burden was sustained. 
(b) Discovery under the Rules gave Defendant fair 
opportunity to inquire concerning the nature and extent of 
Defendant's injuries including permanency, if any, and Defendant 
failed to sufficiently exercise this privilege. 
(c) The first draft of Pretrial Order proposed by 
Plaintiff, a copy of which was given to Defendant's counsel on 
December 14, 1985 in open court at the original Pretrial 
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Conference, plainly indicated that Plaintiff contended his injury 
was permanent in nature. (Addendum A-7 to A-16 at Pg 4) 
Defendant counsel's failure to inquire of the Plaintiff 
as to his then physical condition and complaints when the 
Plaintiff's deposition was taken by the Defendant City, on 
November 19, 1984, was an example of the Defendant failing to 
utilize the discovery privileges in a reasonable way. (TR 122, 
pgs 19, 20) 
Plaintiff's counsel, knowing of the continuing 
disabilities of their client, did arrange for his examination 
immediately prior to trial so that up-to-date medical testimony 
as to his then present condition could be provided to the court 
hearing the case. 
The orthopedic surgeon who treated the Plaintiff orally 
advised Plaintiff's counsel, who had asked for a percentage 
disability evaluation, if possible, that the condition of the 
patient remained much as it had for the previous year and the 
percentage evaluation testified to at the trial was furnished to 
Plaintiff's counsel. This does not indicate, however, that the 
continuing disability, including the need for the continuing 
wearing of a steel-stay corset and the use of a special driver's 
seat on his truck-driver job and his limited personal activities 
were not continuing evidence of the disability without the 
percentage evaluation. The results of the pre-trial physical 
examination of the Plaintiff were verbally given to Defendant's 
counsel as all previous medical informacion had been given prior 
to the date of trial. 
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The full nature and extent of disability and the 
physical condition of the Plaintiff could have been discovered by 
the Defendant through interrogation of the Plaintiff at the time 
of deposition or by a request for examination of the Plaintiff to 
which the Defendant was entitled under Trial Rule 35. The 
failure of Defendant properly to use the discovery process prior 
to the trial date was not due to any misleading by the Plaintiff 
or to failure of the Plaintiff to provide all medical records to 
the Defendant. It was due to the failure of the Defendant to 
plan for and to attend to the necessary steps the defense of the 
case required. 
Counsel's failure to inquire adequately in the 
deposition of the Plaintiff as to his ailments and condition, his 
failure to follow up on medical reports furnished him early in 
the discovery period, his failure to read the original proposed 
pretrial order prepared over six months prior to trial, his 
failure to utilize the discovery process under Rule 35 to have 
the Plaintiff examined and his failure to examine the Plaintiff 
in oral interrogatories upon the nature and extent of his 
injuries all resulted in his apparent sudden discovery on the day 
of trial that his case was not well prepared. 
For some reason Defendant's counsel also did not have 
his own client's employees sign their deoositions taken November 
19, 1984 until June 13, 1985 which was the date of trial. They 
were not filed in Court until the date of trial and they were 
then only filed on the insistence of Plaintiff's counsel. ( Ct. 
Rep. Trans. Pg 16, L 8-10; Pg 17, L-2,3; Transcript Pg 123, 124). 
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The trial court was correct in refusing to bifurcate 
the trial which was a non-jury proceeding upon the oral request 
of the Defendant on the day of trial and in refusing to grant a 
continuance at that time. 
Also, the claim by the Defendant City, that it was 
surprised that Plaintiff's injuries were of a continuing and 
permanent nature was unrealistic and did not entitle the 
Defendant City, to a continuance on the day of trial. The claim 
of a new issue being presented on the trial date is not supported 
by the record. 
Rule 40(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure gives the 
Trial Court discretion as to when on the motion of a party a 
trial may be postponed. There was no sufficient showing by the 
Defendant at the time of its motion which would or could be taken 
as grounds for claiming the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying postponement of the trial. 
The case of Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2nd 269, 373 
P.2d 375 (1962) is not precedent for a claim of abuse of 
discretion in the instant case. In that case, the question was 
whether when one of the parties was unable, due to physical 
condition, to attend at the trial, a continuance or postponement 
should have been granted. Obviously, this situation was not the 
case on the day of trial in the matter now before the Court. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE NATURE AND EXTENT, INCLUDING PERMANENCY, 
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
The nature and extent of Plaintiff's injuries, 
including the extent of permanency, was fairly proved by the 
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evidence and the Trial Court's rulings on admission of the 
evidence were without error. 
In its statement of Issues For Review in its Brief, the 
City states one of the questions before the Court is "Whether or 
not it was error for the Trial Court to admit evidence relating 
to an issue raised for the first time on the day of trial." This 
apparently is tied in to the second point of its argument on page 
15 of its -Brief under the heading "The Court Erred in Admitting 
Evidence Relating to Permanent Disability." It is indicated in 
the argument above herein, there was no "new issue" of permanent 
disability. If there was permanent disability it was a matter of 
proof for the Plaintiff and it was a matter of defense for the 
Defendant. The discovery procedures are provided to permit the 
parties to obtain all of the facts either has with respect to any 
items such as this. 
At the beginning of the trial, Mr. Watson, counsel for 
the City, indicated to the Court that he had learned the previous 
day that the Doctor will be claiming permanent disability of his 
patient, the Plaintiff, at the time of trial. (Ct. Rep. Trans. 
Pgs 2, 3) It was at that time that he said he was going to 
"claim surprise on these damages" and that he wanted the Court to 
proceed with the negligence issue and then if liability is found 
to go to the damage issue and the disability involved. The Court 
considered this a motion to bifurcate the case which it took 
under advisement and proceeded with the matter at hand. The 
Court if effect denied the request by subsequent action and 
there was no error in this denial which was justified under Rule 
40(b) and Rule 42(b) . 
When one of the treating physicians, Dr. Thomas 
Callahan, was called as a witness and before his testimony 
commenced, Mr. Watson made an objection which was handled with 
the following exchange between counsel and the Court: 
MR. NEWBY: "Yes, your Honor. We have a request of the 
Court and counsel. Dr. Callahan just recently finished 
surgery and he's available to us now. If we could 
interrupt the testimony of Mr. Talbot and take him out 
of order." 
THE COURT: "You certainly don't object to that, do 
you?" 
MR. WATSON: "Well, as I stated before, I hoped we'd 
get to the original case before we got into damages, 
since I had an issue with those." 
THE COURT: "You object to it?" 
MR. WATSON: "Yes." 
THE COURT: "Overruled. We don't have a jury to worry 
about. I'm going to take his testimony. . . ." 
(Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg 27, 28) 
When Dr. Neal Cape! , an orthopedic surgeon was called 
to testify by the Plaintiff, he was sworn and after stating his 
qualification, counsel for the Defendant City, admitted that he 
was an expert (Ct. Rep. Trans. Pg 77, L 1, 2 ) . Thereafter, 
during the testimony of the Doctor, when a question was asked 
about an examination by the Doctor of the Plaintiff the day 
before the trial, Mr. Watson offered the following objection: 
"Your Honor, again we are objecting to the examination yesterday 
-- based on surprise." The Court overruled the objection. (Ct. 
Rep. Trans. Pgs. 83-84) 
A careful review of the record fails to disclose any 
other objections to the evidence and no specific objection to a 
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question asked by Plaintiff's counsel or to a tender of an 
exhibit or to the conduct of the court. It is urged that no 
reversible error whatsoever is presented by the record arising 
out of any objections to the evidence presented by Defendant's 
counsel during the trial. 
E. THE DEFENDANT CITY WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION WITHOUT ANY 
FINAL SUMMATION BY COUNSEL FOR EITHER SIDE. 
When the Court, at the conclusion of the evidence in 
the one-day non-jury civil case now being appealed, announced its 
decision from the bench without any attorney summation or closing 
argument, there was no violation as to the City of St. George due 
process guarantees. The record shows no request from the City 
for final argument or any objection made by the City to the Trial 
Court. According, it is not possible to cite a point in the 
transcript or the Court Reporter's transcript where an objection 
was made or was denied. 
It appears that the majority rule in non-jury cases is 
to recognize that the refusal of a Trial Court, sitting without a 
jury in a civil action to allow a litigant's counsel to argue the 
case is not prejudicial error. Many of these decisions are based 
upon the theory that in a trial before the Court without a jury, 
argument of counsel is a privilege, not a right, which is 
accorded the parties by the trial court in its discretion. The 
following cases are pertinent in the various jurisdictions in 
this regard: Dam v. Bond (1926) 80 Cal App 342, 251 P 818; Oil 
Workers International Union v. Superior Court (1951) 103 Cal App 
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2nd 512, 230 P.2d 71. Rodriguez v. Priest (1910) Tex Civ App, 126 
SW 1187; Eldridge v. Rogers (1929) 40 Wyo 89, 275 P 101; Bryn 
Mawr College v. Gold Building & Loan Association (1935) 120 Pa 
Super 246, 182 A 98. 
In a California case it was held that no prejudicial 
error resulted from the conduct of the trial court in announcing 
the impressions produced upon the mind of the Court by the 
evidence before an opportunity was afforded counsel for argument, 
where, upon its attention being called to the omission by 
Defendant's counsel, the Court stated it has merely indicated its 
conclusions, which were subject to change if subsequent arguments 
should -suggest their impropriety, and offered to hear arguments, 
but counsel for the Defendant refused to make any argument. 
Jones v. Lewis (1912) 19 Cal App 575, 126 P 853. 
In the cases in which the question has arisen about the 
impropriety of not allowing final arqument in non-jury cases, the 
question has always arisen after an objection or a request has 
been made which has been denied. In the case at hand, of course, 
there was no objection and no request made for final argument and 
this point presented for the first time on appeal should not be 
considered by the Appellate Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
bifurcation of the trial on the two issues that is (1) Liability 
and (2) Damages or in denying a request for continuance on the 
day of trial. There was no new issue presented because the 
Plaintiff was aoing to offer oroof relative to the degree of 
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partial permanent impairment as a part of the medical testimony 
The award of damages made by the Court was supported by 
substantial, competent evidence and the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed in all respects. 
S/OTT A. GUBLER 
Attorneys for Carl C. Talbot, 
Plaintiff/Respondent. 
P. 0. Box 749 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 628-2676 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the j ^ day 
of November, 1985 he served four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent, with Addendum, upon Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant, V. Lowry Snow and David L. Watson, Snow & Watson, 180 
North 200 East, Suite A, St. George, Utah 84770 by personal 
delivery to a responsible person in their office. 
S&0TT A. GUBLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Respondent 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
205 East Tabernacle 
P. 0. Box 749 
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Phone: (801 ) 628-2676 
CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL C. TALBOT 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
CITY OF ST, GEORGE, A 
Corporate Soul, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9210 
This action came on for trial on the 13th day of June, 
1985 before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge, Fifth 
Judicial District, State of Utah, without intervention of a jury 
on the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Amended Answer of the 
Defendant. The Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, was represented by 
Scott A. Gubler and John E. Newby, attorneys, and the Defendant, 
City of St. George, a Corporate entity, was represented by David 
L. Watson, attorney. 
The pleadings being properly joined and the Court 
having found jurisdiction, the Plaintiff presented his evidence 
in support of his allegations and rested. The Defendant, City of 
St. George, presented its evidence. There was no rebuttal. 
The Court having reviewed the Court file and having 
heard the evidence in this case and being fully advised in the 
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premises, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On the date of the accident, as alleged by the 
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff parked a vehicle he was driving and upon 
a City of St. George pickup truck driven by Ron Larsen, a St. 
George City employee, pulling up beside the vehicle the Plaintiff 
had been driving, the Plaintiff stood next to the pickup truck 
and talked to .the driver through the passenger door. After the 
conversation, he turned to go back to his truck. The Defendant's 
driver did not see or watch him after the conversation was over 
but drove the pickup truck away and the Plaintiff was struck by a 
protuding pipe vise mounted on the right rear of the City truck, 
all consistent with the allegations and the evidence. 
2. This accident occurred at the site of construction 
work and in yery narrow quarters. 
3. The Court finds that the City of St. George, a 
Corporate entity, acting through its agent, Ron Larsen, in the 
course of his employment was negligent in the operation of the 
City vehicle in failing to keep a proper lookout for the 
Plaintiff in the operation of his vehicle and that that 
negligence was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff being struck 
and injured. 
4. The Court finds there was no contributory 
negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, who was 
struck from behind by the protruding pipe vise as Defendant's 
SG8 - 2 -
A O 
truck drove past him. 
5. Plaintiff Talbot was down on the ground for a 
period of time after he was struck- He got up and reported the 
accident to Larsen, Defendant's agent and employee and then went 
on with his duties. 
6. The Court finds that Plaintiff Talbot had to seek 
medical attention, going first to his family physician, Dr. 
Thomas Callahan, and then to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Neal 
Cape! , for treatment and continuing attention. 
7. The Court finds that the undisputed testimony of 
Dr. Neal Capel was to the effect that the Plaintiff, Carl C. 
Talbot, suffered a permanent injury, being a 10% impairment of 
the man as a whole and that at-the time of the trial he was of 
the age of 45 years. The Court takes judicial notice of United 
States Life Tables, 1973, indicating that the life expectancy of 
a 45-year-old white male is 27.8 years. 
8. The Court now finds undisputed evidence of Special 
Damages, including medical expense and lost earnings of the 
Plaintiff amounted to $3,392.00, for which he should recover and 
that he is entitled to 23,744.00 in General Damages, taking into 
consideration his permanent impairment and that he should recover 
for such loss General Damages in the amount of $23,744.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court having found that the Plaintiff was free 
of negligence and that the Defendant was negligent and that the 
negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury, the 
Court now concludes that the Plaintiff should recover damages in 
this action. 
2. The Court concludes that the Plaintiff should have 
judgment in the sum of $3,392 as and for Special Damages and 
$23,744.00 as and for General Damages and should have judgment 
accordingly in the sum of $27,136.00 plus his costs in this 
action fn the of $ dnd the Clerk is ordered to enter 
judgment accordingly. ' ' y/ 
DATED this f t ) ' day o , 1985 
istrict Coiirt Judge 
Fifth Judicial District 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this £ / Z A day of July, 
1985, I did personally mail, postage prepaid, a true copy of the 
above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT ORDER to David 
L. Watson, Attorney for Defendant, 180 North 200 East, 
St. George, Utah 84770. 
<^zf^^^ 
-e* 
Secretary 
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SCOTT A. GUBLER 
JOHN E. NEWBY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
205 East Tabernacle 
P. 0. Box 749 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Phone: (801) 628-2676 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DKT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
CLERK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE F IFTH JUDIC IAL D ISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL C. TALBOT, ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
vs 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, A 
Corporate Soul , Civil No. 9210 
Defendant. 
) 
This action came on for trial on the 13th day of June, 
1985 before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge, Fifth 
Judicial District, State of Utah, without intervention of a jury 
on the Plaintiff's Complaint and the Amended Answer of the 
Defendant. The Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, was represented by 
Scott A. Gubler and John E. Newby, attorneys, and the Defendant, 
City of St. George, a Corporate entity, was represented by David 
L. Watson, attorney. 
The pleadings being properly joined and the Court 
having found jurisdiction, the Plaintiff presented his evidence 
in support of his allegations and rested. The Defendant, City of 
St. George, presented its evidence. There was no rebuttal. 
i 
The Court having signed it's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in this matter on July 10, 1985 now enters an 
Order and Judgment in Accordance+herewith. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That the Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, recover from 
the Defendant, City of St. George, a Corpordte entity, the sum of 
$3,392.00 for Special Damages and $23,744.00 as and for General 
Damages for a total recovery for damages of $27,136.00 and his 
cost in this action in the sum of $ and the Clerk 
is ordered to enter judgment^accordingly. 
Dated t h i s ^ / d a y of J u l y , 1985 
y / 
ris.trict Court Judge 
Fifth Judicial District 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby ertify that on this / / ^ day of July, 
1985, I did personally mail, postage prepaid, a true copy of the 
above and foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to David L. Watson, 
Attorney for Defendant, 180 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 
84770. 
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SCOTT A. GUBLER 
JOHN E. NEWBY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
205 East Tabernacle 
P. 0. Box 749 
St. George, Utah 34770 
Phone: (801) 628-2676 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL C. TALBOT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, A 
Corporate Soul , 
PROPOSED PRETRIAL ORDER 
Civil No. 9210 
In accordance with Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the above matter came on for Pretrial Hearing on 
December 14, 1984, before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District 
Judge, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, with the 
Plaintiff being represented by Scott A. Gubler and John E. Newby, 
attorneys and the Defendant, City of St. George, being 
represented by David k- Watson, Attorney. The court, after 
having heard counsel for the respective parties, hereby frames 
the issues of fact and law together with other pertinent matters 
resulting from the pretrial conference and disposes of them as 
follows: 
IT IS ORDERED: 
I. NATURE OF ACTION. 
This is a suit for personal injury claimed to have 
been sustained by Carl C. Talbot, Plaintiff, arising from an 
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accident of April 5, 1983. Mr. Talbot sued the City of St, 
George, Utah, alleging that a City pickup truck was negligently 
operated by City employees causing a pipe vise mounted on the 
left rear portion of the truck to strike his back as the truck 
drove away from a position where he had been a pedestrian talking 
to the City employees. The issues are raised by the Complaint 
filed and served in August, 1983 by Mr. Talbot after notice of 
claim by him to the City on June 1, 1983; and by the Answer and 
Amended Answer of the City. A cost bond in the sum of $300 with 
corporate surety thereon was filed by the Plaintiff. 
II. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. 
Plaintiff's attorneys have offered to engage in 
settlement discussions but Defendant's counsel indicates he has 
no authority to settle. 
III. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff contends that on April 5, 1983 he 
was employed as a truck driver by J&J Building Supply of St. 
George, Utah and was driving a 1974 International 34 wheel 
vehicle which consisted of a tractor and two belly dump trailers 
used for hauling gravel commonly known as road base. On that 
date at about midday or shortly afternoon, he had a load of road 
base or gravel that was to be delivered to an area on the grounds 
adjacent to Dixie Downs Racetrack where it was intended to build 
an area to house recreational vehicles. He drove his rig into 
the area and stopped on the right hand side of the area and 
waited for the City employees whom he had told he would be there 
to meet with him. Shortly thereafter, Ron Larsen drove to the 
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area in a City pickup truck accompanied by a second City employee 
who was sitting in the passenger seat. This pickup truck was 
stopped three or four feet to the left of the J&J Building Supply 
rig which had been driven to that area by Mr. Talbot. Mr. Talbot 
got down from his tractor, walked a little to the rear and up to 
the door on the passenger side of the pickup truck where he 
talked through the window to Mr. Larsen. The conversation 
involved where Mr. Talbot was to dump the load of road base. 
After a short conversation in which he obtained the instructions 
he requested, Mr. Talbot turned to get back in his vehicle and 
Mr. Larsen drove off heading straight west. Unknown at that time 
to Mr. Talbot, but known to Mr. Larsen and the other City 
employee, there was mounted on the right rear corner and sticking 
out from the body of the City vehicle a pipe vise which extended 
from one foot to fifteen inches from the side of the vehicle. As 
Mr. Larsen drove away, this pipe vise, before Mr. Talbot could 
get into his tractor, struck Mr. Talbot, then a pedestrian, in 
the back below his ribcage and knocked him to the ground and 
against the front wheel of his vehicle. The City vehicle 
continued to drive away and parked in an area to the west of the 
point of impact, the distance being estimated at not less than 
100 feet. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant, City of St. 
George, was negligent in that its employee, Mr. Larsen, operated 
the City of St. George pickup truck in a careless and negligent 
manner so that the vehicle pulled forward and a protrusion from 
the right side of the vehicle struck Mr. Talbot, the Plaintiff in 
the back before he was clear of the protrusion; further, that he 
^ci 
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was struck as he turned and moved toward the open door of his own 
rig to get into it and that he did not know of the danqer from 
the pipe vise which extended beyond the truck body and which 
struck him in the back as the City vehicle moved away from the 
point where the conversation had occurred. The Plaintiff 
contends there was no flag or other warning device attached to 
the protrusion from the right side of the vehicle so as to 
indicate that such a protrusion did in fact exist. As a result 
of the accident and injury to his back, the Plaintiff consulted 
and was treated by Drs. Thomas Callahan and N. C. Cape! of St. 
George, Utah and by Physical Therapy Associates of St. George. 
The Plaintiff suffered a back injury diagnosed as a low back 
strain and sprain resulting in degenerative changes of the dorso 
lumbar junction where the strain and sprain is most prominent. 
In order to obtain relief and to be able to work, he has been 
fitted with a Taylor brace, dorso lumbar with four steel stays. 
He was totally and temporarily disabled erafeffl^^^f and unable to 
work during the period from April 6 through April 11, 1983 and 
from July 12 through July 17, 1983 and periodical pain and 
discomfort from said injury. Plaintiff has incurred medical 
expenses for treatment, d i a g n o s i s , rehabilitation and care on 
account of the injuries received as aforesaid in the sum of 
$800.00- He suffered lost earning in the sum of $ and 
has a permanent disability. 
The Defendant contends that there was no 
negligence on the part of its employees in operating the City 
vehicle and states that it is without information from its 
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employees that the vehicle in fact did strike the person of the 
Plaintiff. 
IV. RESERVATIONS AS TO FACTS. 
Except as stated under [II above, there are no 
known reservations as to facts specified in Paragraph III above. 
V. STIPULATED FACTS. 
The following facts, though not admitted, are not 
to be contested at the trial by evidence to the contrary: 
a) That a City of St. George vehicle, being a 
Chevrolet pickup truck having number 112 as an identifying mark, 
was driven by Ron Larsen as a city employee in the course of his 
employment on the date and at the time of the alleged injury. 
b) A pipe vise was in fact fixed to the right 
rear corner of said vehicle and said pipe rack extended from the 
side of the vehicle at a distance of from 9 to 15 inches. 
c) Carl C. Talbot, the Plaintiff, informed Ron 
Larsen and the other City employee, one Clarence Clark Laub at 
the scene and on April 5, 1983 of his injury and demonstrated the 
fact showing a mark on his back. 
d) The Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, received 
treatment from Dr. Thomas Callahan and Dr. Heal C. Capel as well 
as Physical Therapy Associates of St. George, Inc. 
e) Charges incurred with Dr. Callahan were 
$ 
f) Charges incurred with Dr. Capel were 
g) Charges incurred with Physical Therapy 
Associates of St. George, Inc. were $284 
h) Charges incurred for back brace and other 
devices was $ 
Center were $ 
i) Charges incurred for x-rays at Dixie Medical 
, and 
j) Such charges and expenses to date were 
reasonable for the services rendered. 
VI. ISSUES OF FACT. 
The following issues of fact, and no others, 
remain to be litigated upon the trial: 
1. Whether the Defendant, the City of St. George, 
was negligent when its employee, Ron Larsen, drove the City 
pickup truck, away from the point of conversation with the 
Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, before making sure that Talbot was out 
of the way so that the pipe vise at the right rear of the truck 
would clear the Plaintiff's person. 
2. Whether the City of St. George was negligent 
in maintaining a pipe vise at the right rear corner of its 
vehicle protruding from 9/l5 inches from the side of the vehicle 
without any warning flag of the presence of said protrusion from 
the side of the vehicle. 
3. Whether the Defendant, City of St. George, 
acting through its driver, Ron Larsen, was negligent in failing 
to warn the Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, of the oresence of the 
pipe vise mounted on the right rear of its truck when the truck 
was about to be moved away from the point of conversation with 
the Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot. 
<sG# _c 
4. Whether the negligence, if any, of the 
Defendant, acting through its agent, Ron Larsen, was the 
proximate cause of the injury to the Plaintiff, Carl C. Talbot, 
and his resulting damages. 
5. The damages sustained by the Plaintiff, if 
any. 
6. Whether the conduct of the Plaintiff at the 
time of his injury was in any way negligent. 
7. What percentage of negligence, if any, should 
be allocated to the respective parties to this action. 
VII. EXHIBITS 
The exhibits to be offered at the trial, together 
with a statement of all admissions by and all issues between the 
parties with respect thereto are as follows: 
A. P l a i n t i f f s Exhibits: 
PI and P2 - Two photographs of pipe vise (no 
foundation needed, admitted same was vise 
mounted on city vehicle at time of accident) 
P3, P4, P5, and P6 - Photographs of City 
truck Number 112 from various angles 
including left side, right rear, right front 
and showing left rear up close looking from 
above at an angle (no foundation needed) 
P7 - Copy of bill from Dr. Thomas Callahan 
P8 - Copies of 4 bills from Dr. Cape! , bills 
totaling $133.00 
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P9 - 2 bills from Dixie Medical Center total 
$246.50. 
P10 - Bills from Jenco Medical Supply, $68.00 
Pll - Bill Physical Therapy Associates, Inc., 
$284.00 
P12 - Bill from Southern Utah Radiology, 
$244.00. 
P13 - Photograph of tractor driven by 
Plaintiff at time of accident. /^^ vh 
B. Defendant, City of St. George Exhibits: 
Dl -
D2 -
VIII. ISSUES OF LAW. 
The following issues of law, and no others, remain 
to be litigated upon the trial: 
1. There are no issues of law not implicit in 
the issues of fact stated above 
2. 
IX. BRIEFS ON LAW. 
Briefs of questions of law are to be filed with 
the clerk and copies furnished to opposing counsel oneweek in 
advance of the trial date. 
X. TRIAL DATE. 
This matter is set for trial to the Court, without 
intervention of a jury, on the day of , 
19 . Estimated time of trial is days. 
SG3 
XI. WITNESSES. 
A. Plaintiffs Witnesses - All witness known at 
this time to be called by the Plaintiff to testify, except those 
who may be called for impeachment purposes only, are: 
1. Carl C. Talbot 
2. Dr. Thomas D. Callahan 
3. Dr. Neal C. Cape! 
4. Ronald F. Lars en 
5. Clarence Clark Laub 
6. Any persons needed to prove foundation 
for medical records and bills listed in Plaintiff's exhibits 
above. 
7. All Defendant's witnesses 
B. Defendant's Witnesses 
1. Ronald F. Larsen 
2. Clarence Clark Laub 
3. 
XII. DISCOVERY. 
Additional discovery which will be need by the 
Plaintiff will include a request to produce any and all 
statements made by Ronald F. Larsen or Clarence Clark Laub or 
either of them relating to the events which occurred on April 5, 
1933 as claimed in the complaint in this action. 
XIII. The foregoing admissions having been made by the 
parties and the parties having specified the foregoing issues of 
fact and law remaining to be litigated, this order shall 
supplement the pleading and govern the course of the trial in 
this case, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
DATED this day of , 198_. 
district Court Judge 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this day of 
, 1984, I did hand deliver a true copy of the 
above and foregoing PRETRIAL ORDER to David L. Watson, 180 North 
200 East, St. George, Utah 84770 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 8(a)(1) 
(a) Claims for Relief. 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; ... 
Rule 8(e)(1) 
(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency. 
IT) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, 
concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions 
are required. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 40(b) 
(b) Postponement of the Trial 
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Rule 4 2 ( b ) 
(b) S e p a r a t e T r i a l s . 
The court in f u r t h e r a n c e of c o n v e n i e n c e or 
avoid p r e j u d i c e may order a se p a r a t e trial of any c l a i m , 
c r o s s - c l a i m , c o u n t e r c l a i m , or t h i r d - p a r t y c l a i m , or of any 
separate issue or of any number of c l a i m s , c r o s s - c l a i m s , 
c o u n t e r c l a i m s , t h i r d - p a r t y claims or i s s u e s . 
to 
